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Taxation of bequests and donations is an important determinant of real estate prices. We show 
that, ceteris paribus, a decrease in taxes on inter vivos donations and bequests brings about an 
increase in real estate prices. We provide a general equilibrium rationalization in the context 
of OLG economies featuring intergenerational altruism. This has relevant policy implications. 
We test the predictions of our theory employing a unique policy shock: the abolition of 
bequest and donation taxation that took place in Italy in 2001. Considering this policy shift 
provides the first evidence that a drastic reduction in bequest and donation taxation 
significantly increased real estate prices. Our estimates suggest that the 2001 abolition of 
taxation on bequests and donations alone led to an appreciation of residential real estate in 
excess of 10%. 
JEL Code: E62, H30. 
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support. 1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e⁄ect of the tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos do-
nations on long-lasting assets in general and real estate in particular. This is not just
an academic question but it has immediate policy relevance in the current European and
American debate. Italy controversially abolished taxation on bequests and donations in
2001. President Obama is considering to reintroduce it, after President Bush opted for
its complete abolition starting from 2010.1 In addition, real estate prices played a cen-
tral role in the current and past ￿nancial crisis and we should carefully consider of their
determinants.
This study argues theoretically and shows empirically that the tax treatment of bequest
and inter vivos donations (for brevity: bequest taxation from now on) is an important
determinant of the price dynamics of long-lived assets in general, and real estate in partic-
ular.2 First, we develop a theoretical analysis in the context of economies with overlapping
generations to show that changes in bequest taxation have a general equilibrium e⁄ect on
real estate prices. Our theoretical perspective shows that the intent of policymakers to
ease the ￿scal burden - by lowering bequest taxation - on a particular set of assets, namely
real estate, ends up making them less a⁄ordable for the majority of the population. Then,
exploiting a unique policy shock that took place in Italy during 2001, we provide support-
ing evidence that the abolition of bequest taxation had a signi￿cant and sizeable positive
e⁄ect on real estate prices, beyond what can be explained by macroeconomic and demo-
graphic fundamentals. Given the characteristics of such a policy change - a quasi natural
experiment-, this is the ￿rst paper to provide such evidence.
Italy o⁄ers an extraordinary opportunity to investigate and test the role of bequest
taxation as a determinant of asset pricing, a point already suggested by Constantinides et
al [5]: bequest taxation was in place at non negligible rates until the middle of 2001 and
1The Italian Law 383/2001 stated that the tax previously imposed on bequests and inter vivos dona-
tions (among family members) would be abolished for all transfers taking place after October 25th 2001.
The bequest tax rate was progressive up to the maximum of 33%. Bequest and donation taxation was
reintroduced in 2006, by Decree 262/2006, although at much lower rates and with substantially larger
exemption thresholds. For a preview on the American debate see "Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax",
Wall Street Journal, January 12th 2009.
2Constantinides et al [5] already pointed out the potentially important role of bequest for asset pricing
in the context of the equity premium puzzle while Bernheim et al. [2] highlight how agents react to tax
incentives in the timing of interegenerational transfers. Recently, intergenerational transfers and estate
taxation are receiving renewed (theoretical) attention as shown in Farhi et al. [6], [7].
1was abolished starting from that year.3 There are three reasons to believe that taxation
on bequests and donations is particularly important in the context of the housing market.
First, housing donation is by far the predominant asset through which intergenerational
transfers are carried out. Second, di⁄erently from other assets, the ratio of real estate
donations over market transactions averaged more than 50% across the 13 major Italian
cities in 2004. Finally, at the national level, the number of inter vivos donations in
residential real estate showed a sharp increase after bequest taxation was abolished (Figure
1). The sudden change in economic behavior seems to indicate that the e⁄ect of the policy
change was far from negligible. Restricting attention to the 13 major Italian cities, the
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Figure 1 - Italy: Donated Residential Units
The surge in real estate prices has been a global phenomenon up to 2007. Between 1997
and 2003 real estate prices in di⁄erent economies - Australia, France, Ireland, Netherlands,
3Until 2001 the tax rate on bequest and donations ranged from 3% to 33%, depending on the amount
of the transfer.
4Bequest taxation was already reduced in 2000 by Law 242/2000, but this had little e⁄ect on real estate
prices as the numbers of donations - which fell - and sales were not a⁄ected. A possible explanation of
why the reduction of 2000 did not increase the number of donations is that agents were expecting a further
reduction in the tax, that in fact took place in 2001.
2Spain and the United Kingdom - have risen by more than 70 percent while Italy and the
US have witnessed increase in excess of 30%.5 By and large, it is not di¢ cult to rationalize
this empirical evidence if one considers that, during that period, most of these countries
experienced sustained economic growth, some population growth and low real interest
rates. First, everybody￿ s income - and the income of the young in particular - depends
closely on economic growth through salary compensations. Second, demographic growth
increases the relative weight of the young generation within a given population and puts
upward pressure on the available stock of housing. Third, the ease and accessibility of
credit granted by low real interest rate facilitates the purchase of real estate and so it
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Figure 2 - Germany and Italy: a Comparizon
In the group of economies mentioned above Italy stands as a noticeable exception:
during that period it experienced low economic growth, demographic stagnation, while
it bene￿tted from decreasing real interest rates. Nonetheless it displayed substantial real
5IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004.
3estate appreciation. This was far from obvious: although Germany shared with Italy poor
economic, demographic and real interest rates dynamics, its real estate prices have been
falling over the same decade (Figure 2). We view this stark di⁄erence as additional moti-
vation for our enquiry in the speci￿c role of bequest taxation in relation with real estate
prices. In fact, residential real estate appreciation coincided in Italy with the abolition of
bequest taxation. This paper wants to highlight the importance of this additional factor
as a plausible source of the di⁄erence between the real estate appreciation that took place
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Figure 3. Italy: Residential Real Estate Donations and Prices
The main contribution of this paper is to build a relationship between real estate
price appreciation and the sharp increase of donations in the residential market due to
the abolition of bequest taxation. Figure 3 o⁄ers preliminary evidence in support of our
claim. We can provide the intuition for our result relying on a ￿no arbitrage￿argument.
An agent owning housing units has to decide, as the end of his life approaches, how to
use his housing stock. He can either leave this stock to his o⁄springs for an ￿altruistic￿
motive or he can sell it on the market and receive the market price. In the ￿rst case,
6Our discussion touches upon the recent debate regarding the development (and the eventual burst) of
a bubble in the real estate market. For the sake of this paper we do not take a stance on whether there
was a bubble in the real estate market of developed economies.
4he will bene￿t from the indirect utility he enjoys from his o⁄springs satisfaction, net of
any tax that this transfer may be subject to. In the second case, he will have a stock of
￿money￿wealth that he can use as he likes, including intergenerational money transfers,
net of taxation. If the market equilibrium is characterized by the coexistence of donations
and resales of houses, it must be the case that the representative agent is indi⁄erent at the
margin between donating a unit of housing to his o⁄springs or reselling it in the market
for the market price.
When taxes on bequests and donations are abolished, two e⁄ects take place. The ￿rst
e⁄ect is a direct one: the marginal bene￿t of donating increases and so agents adjust
their optimal behavior to increase the amount of donations in their ￿housing portfolio￿ .
The second e⁄ect is a general equilibrium one related to the no-arbitrage condition: as
more and more people donate their housing stock, the market price of residential real
estate must increase until a new equilibrium price is reached where the indi⁄erence, in
utility terms, between resale and donation is restored. The new equilibrium is therefore
characterized by a larger number of donations and higher market prices of real estate.
The line of reasoning behind our intuition can be generalized and extended to a variety
of assets that can be used to make intergenerational transfers. It is nonetheless important
to focus on real estate because, especially in developed economies, this is not only the most
commonly used asset when intergenerational transfers are involved, but it also represents
a sizeable share of optimal portfolio strategy and a central element of any ￿nancial crisis.7
This justi￿es even more the special focus of this study and our interest in the relationship
between bequest taxation and real estate prices.
Not surprisingly, the behavior of real estate prices is the subject of a voluminous lit-
erature. A substantial body of (mostly empirical) literature tries to estimate short and
long-run macroeconomic determinants of house prices (for a review of recent contribu-
tions, see Girouard et al. [9]). Although many of these studies di⁄er with respect to the
countries and the time period considered, most of them reach the conclusion that demand-
side factors such as income, interest rates, and demographic factors related to household
formation play a key role for the dynamics of house prices. In a set of interesting applica-
tions, the ￿tted values from regressions are then related to the fundamental price which is
compared to the actual price to discuss the presence of real estate bubbles as in Mc Carthy
and Peach [14], and Terrones [20] (with aggregate data), and Abraham and Hendershott
[1], Case and Shiller [4], Himmelberg et al. [13], and Smith and Smith [19] (with regional
7Fugazza et al. [8] document how the optimal investment strategy assigns a share between 10 and 20
percent to real estate investment. Also see Pelizzon and Weber [15].
5and city-level data). In a series of recent papers, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks [10], [11]
highlighted the role of regulatory barriers to new constructions and land use restrictions
as supply-side factors that can help to explain the rise of house prices in the US.
The focus of our analysis, the role of the real estate taxation in a⁄ecting house prices,
has been analyzed by Bruce and Holtz-Eakin [3], and Hendershott and Price [12] who
followed the seminal contributions by Poterba [17], [16]. However, neither this strand of
literature nor the former addressed the issue that we raise in this paper, that is, the e⁄ect
of bequest taxation on real estate prices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the market
equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the properties of the equilibrium and the relationship
between bequest taxation and real estate prices. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence
and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy: Set Up
We present our analysis in the context of a production economy with overlapping gener-
ations living for two periods. We de￿ne generation t to be the set of individuals of unit
measure, endowed with one unit of labor, Lt. Generation t is born at the beginning of
period t and leaves the economy at the end of period t + 1. Every generation consumes
one non-durable good in each period of life: c1t units when young and c2t units when old.
In addition to these goods, each generation chooses how much (durable) housing services,
Ht, to enjoy during lifetime. Generation t utility function ￿t is de￿ned as follows:
￿t = Ut + ￿Ut+1
Ut = u(c1t) + u(c2t) + v(Ht)
u0; v0 > 0; u00; v00 < 0
0 < ￿ ￿ 1
(1)
where u(￿) and v(￿) denote the utility derived from consumption of non-durable goods and
housing services respectively, and ￿ labels intergenerational altruism. In maximizing (1),
generation t faces two budget constraints:






+ (1 ￿ ￿)Dt￿1 ￿ iH
t (2)
c2t = stRt+1 + pt+1Hsale
t ￿ Dt (3)
where wt represents labor income, st savings, Rt+1 the interest factor (one plus the interest
rate) on savings at t + 1, pt the housing price in the private market, Hdon
t￿1 the amount of
6housing services that generation t receives from generation t￿1; Hmkt
t the amount of hous-
ing purchased by generation t in period t, Hsale
t the amount of housing sold by generation
t when old in period t + 1, iH
t is generation t investment in housing and Dt the amount
of consumption good donated by generation t to generation t + 1 in period t + 1 (which
we call ￿money￿ ). The government levies a bequest tax on any type of intergenerational
donation. Therefore, transfer of housing and ￿money￿between generations is charged a
proportional cost of 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.8
Although the interpretation may seem completely standard, the reader should notice
how equation (2) is set up. Hmkt
t represents the actual amount of housing that generation
t acquires through intergenerational transfers and private markets in period t.






t represents the supply of newly produced housing services. The interpretation
of equation (4) is that consumption of housing services by generation t can not exceed the
sum of what is purchased in private markets and what is independently built. Moreover
generation t is subject to:
Hsale
t + Hdon
t ￿ Ht(1 ￿ ￿) (5)
where ￿ represents the depreciation of housing services consumed by generation t. The
intuition for (5) is that generation t can allocate its depreciated stock of housing services
in period t + 1 between donation to generation t + 1 and resale in private markets.
The economy is endowed with two production functions. The ￿rst produces housing




f0 > 0; f00 < 0
We assume that housing produced by one generation becomes part of housing consumption
of that same generation.
The production function of the non-durable good displays constant returns of scale in
8Bequest is taxed in the same way no matter what its form is (housing or ￿money￿ ). This feature is
common to developed ￿scal system and applies in particular to the italian case whose evidence we will
study.
7capital, Kt; and labor, Lt; and satis￿es the law of diminishing returns to single factors:
Yt = G(Kt;Lt)
GK > 0; GL > 0
GKK < 0; GLL < 0
(6)
Capital is created at no cost from period t consumption good and is employed to produce
t + 1 non durable good. Capital fully depreciates from one period to the next and so
capital accumulation follows:
Kt+1 = It (7)
It is convenient to express aggregate production in (t-generation) per capita terms exploit-
ing constant returns to scale assumption and the fact that Lt = 1, 8t:
yt = g(kt)
g0 > 0; g00 < 0
where yt and kt are output and capital expressed in per capita terms. Thus (7) can be
rewritten in per capita terms as:
kt+1 = it (8)
where it represents per capita investment.
2.1 Market Equilibrium: De￿nition
The market equilibrium is de￿ned by choice vector (c1t; c2t; it; iH














s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5); 8t
2. the goods￿market clears:
c1t + c2t￿1 + iH








represents the tax revenues raised by the government, in order to ￿nance public
consumption.





Notice that we can exploit the conditions above to ￿nd the two dynamic equations
that describe the evolution of capital and housing stock in the economy. First, we observe




















which means that the stock of housing for generation t; Ht; is the sum of what was resold on
the market by generation t￿1, Hsale
t￿1 , what was inherited by generation t from generation
t ￿ 1; Hdon






Equation (12) fully describes the dynamics of the housing stock of the economy.
Moreover, by (9), we have:
c1t + iH
t + Tt + it = g(kt) ￿ c2t￿1 (13)
Using equation (3), it yields:
st￿1Rt = g(kt) ￿ wt = c2t￿1 + Dt￿1 ￿ ptHsale
t￿1
so that equation (13) becomes:
it = wt + Dt￿1 ￿ ptHsale
t￿1 ￿ c1t ￿ iH
t ￿ Tt
and, substituting for (8), (10), we ￿nd:







and by (2) and (11)
kt+1 = st (14)
where we have that future capital stock is equal to current private savings since there is
full depreciation of capital. The assumption that capital fully depreciates has no e⁄ect
on the qualitative implications of our analysis. If capital was not fully depreciated, the
old generations would end up selling and/or donating it to the young generation as they
will do with the stock of housing. The same implications that our analysis draws for
housing could then be extended to capital. But they would remain in place nonetheless.
This completes the description of the dynamic evolution of the aggregate variables of the
economy.
93 The Equilibrium Price of Real Estate
Solving the maximization problem for generation t and substituting the FOCs with respect
to Hmkt
t and Hsale
t into the FOC with respect to Ht we obtain:
v0(Ht) = ptu0(c1t) ￿ pt+1u0(c2t)(1 ￿ ￿) (15)
This equation has a very simple interpretation: it states that the marginal bene￿t of
consuming an additional unit of housing must be equal to its marginal cost for generation
t measured by the di⁄erence between the utility weighted cost of purchasing housing -
ptu0(c1t) - and the utility weighted bene￿t of reselling it when old, net of depreciation -
pt+1u0(c2t)(1 ￿ ￿).
A similar condition may be derived with respect to the optimal amount of donation,
substituting the FOC with respect to Hdon
t into the FOC with respect to Ht:
v0(Ht) = ptu0(c1t) ￿ pt+1(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ u0(c1t+1)(1 ￿ ￿) (16)
Equation (16) can be interpreted as the equality between the marginal bene￿t of con-
suming an additional unit of housing and the marginal cost measured by the di⁄erence
between the utility weighted cost of purchasing housing - [ptu0(c1t)] - and the utility
weighted bene￿t of donating it to generation t + 1 net of taxation and depreciation -
[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ pt+1u0(c1t+1)(1 ￿ ￿)].
Joining (15) and (16), it is easy to observe that, in equilibrium, each generation will
choose consumption when old and the level of donation so that the marginal utility of
its consumption equates the marginal utility of consumption of the following generation,
discounted by the degree of intergenerational altruism (￿) and bequest taxation (￿):
u0(c2t) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ u0(c1t+1) (17)
Equation (17) shows that generation t may ￿nd it optimal to decrease its consumption
when old allowing for larger intergenerational transfers. Moreover, comparing equation
(17) with the FOC with respect to st:




= (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1 (19)
Equation (19) is interesting because it helps understanding the dynamic behavior of the
economy. Since Rt+1 > 1 and (1 ￿ ￿)￿ 6 1, the right-hand side could be larger, equal
10or smaller than one. If [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1] > 1, this would imply that consumption when
young increases from one generation to the next. Viceversa, if [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1] < 1
then it would decrease from one generation to the following one. In order to fully exploit
equation (19), we de￿ne the steady state of the economy:
De￿nition 1 The steady state of the economy is de￿ned by constant allocations across
generations:
c1t = c1t+1 = c1;8t
c2t = c2t+1 = c2;8t
Ht = H;8t
Given the stationary environment by assumption, we can safely focus on the stationary
steady state of the economy. Therefore, since Rt+1 is just an endogenous price - the relative
price of consumption when young over consumption when old -, in the steady state it must
adjust so that
u0(c1t)
u0(c1t+1) = 1. By (19) and (18), we have:
R =
1
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(20)









and so, by (20):
p =
v0(H)
u0(c1)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
(22)
which is the same expression that we could have derived for real estate prices in steady
state using equation (16). The resulting steady state real estate price, p, can be used -
joining FOCs with respect to iH
t and Hmkt






To fully characterize the steady state real estate price, it is worthwhile to state the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 In steady state, the price of housing, p:
1. increases as the tax rate on bequests, ￿, decreases;
2. increases as housing depreciation, ￿, decreases;
113. increases as the level of intergenerational altruism, ￿, increases if the substitution
e⁄ect (weakly) dominates the income e⁄ect.
Proof. See Appendix for proof of (2) and (3).
We ￿nd it worthwhile to describe the simple proof for (1) here. In the case of a decrease
in ￿, one needs to consider its e⁄ect on the interest rate. Start observing that, by (20), a
decrease in ￿ decreases the real interest rate R in steady state. If the substitution e⁄ect
dominates the income e⁄ect, a decrease in the real interest rate increases, c1, and decreases





[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
(24)





must increase for (22) to be satis￿ed. Since






contradiction, that only v0(H) decreases but p remains unchanged. This implies that H
increases. But this is only possible, by (12), iH also increases. Then f0(iH) must decrease
and, by (23), p thus increases in steady state, contradicting the assumption that only
v0(H) decreases.
The main result of proposition 1 is that raising bequest taxes depresses the price of
housing in steady state. The intuition is based on a ￿no arbitrage￿argument. Once it
has been enjoyed by the generation that owns it, housing can be employed in two ways: it
can either be sold on the market at given price p or it can be transferred to the following
generation. In equilibrium, the two uses must yield the same return, otherwise only one
use - the one delivering more utility - would be observed. As bequest taxation increases,
the bene￿t of intergenerational transfers decreases. Therefore, old agents would be less
willing to bequeath and more willing to sell their houses on the market: the increased
supply would then lower equilibrium prices. The decrease in the real estate price, p;
continues until the utility that the old enjoy by selling houses on the market equalizes
the one enjoyed by transferring it to the following generation, net of bequest taxes. It is
interesting to notice that, if an increase in taxes on monetary bequests a⁄ect the price
of any ￿nancial asset that exceeds the lifespan of a generation, an increase in taxes on
housing bequests a⁄ects the price of real estate only.
Rearranging (15) and including (18), we get the following di⁄erence equation describing
the dynamic evolution of real estate prices:
1
pt
[pt+1(1 ￿ ￿)u0(c2t) + v0(Ht)] = Rt+1u0(c2t) (25)
12It is worthwhile to give an economic interpretation to equation (25), since it will play
an important role in the remaining part of our discussion. Equation (25) is the relevant
no arbitrage condition of the economy. One unit of consumption buys 1=pt of housing at
time t. The overall return of the investment in housing is given by v0(Ht), the increase
of utility due to consuming an extra unit of housing plus pt+1(1 ￿ ￿)u0(c2t), the increase
of utility due to additional consumption of the ￿nal good in period t + 1 when housing
is resold. The return from housing investment must be equal to the return of buying one
unit of capital, given by Rt+1u0(c2t).
Equivalently, one can rewrite (25) employing (17):
pt+1
pt
(1 ￿ ￿) = Rt+1 ￿
v0(Ht)=pt
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ u0(c1t+1)
(26)
which states some important facts. We summarize this observation by the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 The rate of real estate appreciation,
pt+1
pt
1. increases when the rate of return on capital investment increases;
2. decreases when the utility of the old generation from a unit spent on housing, (v0(Ht)=pt),
increases;
3. decreases as the average consumption of the young generation, c1t+1, increases;
4. decreases when taxation on bequest, ￿; increases.
We only provide an intuition for proposition 2 since the proof is standard. Part 1
states that housing must appreciate if its opportunity cost, i.e. the reward of investing
in capital markets, increases. Part 2 suggests that housing does not need to appreciate
substantially if it already provides valuable services per unit of consumption spent on it.
Part 3 shows that the higher is the demand for the non-durable good, the lower is the
price of the durable good, given that the two goods are substitutes in the utility function
of the agent. Finally part 4 complements proposition 1, by stating that, when bequest
taxation increases, the price of real estate not only falls in the new steady state, but does
so at a rate that depends positively on the level of ￿.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we bring our analysis to the data testing the e⁄ect on real estate prices of
bequest taxation. We use a unique dataset built by combining a variety of sources, two
13of which are proprietary (real estate prices and donations) and were not available before.
We focus on (proprietary) prices (per squared meter) of urban residential real estate
units in the 13 major Italian cities over time.9 These cities together represent slightly
more than 15% of the current Italian population. We combine economic and demographic
data about Italy, European real estate price data and data from the Italian Ministry of
Economics regarding residential real estate donations. Data have annual frequency and are
disaggregated by city to build a panel dataset covering the period 1993-2004. This includes
2001 when bequest and donation taxation was abolished. All variables were netted of CPI
in￿ ation10 and should be considered real.
We test the main empirical prediction of this paper regarding the relationship between
bequest and inter vivos donation taxation and real estate prices, as stated by propositions
1 and 2. Since our dataset covers slightly more than a decade and inter vivos donations
react much faster than bequests but are taxed in the same way, we will focus on the former
to show the e⁄ect of this kind of taxation on real estate prices. We start by the preliminary
test:
￿pit = ￿i + ￿ ￿ time + ￿ ￿ Tax + "it
where the dependent variable ￿pit represents the growth rate in the price of residential
housing (per squared-meter) in city i between year t and t￿1; time is the time trend and
Tax is the time dummy taking value 1 in all years when bequest and donation taxation
was abolished (year ￿ 2001).










* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Table 1
9In the basic empirical exercise we focus on the price of already established real estate, i.e. we do not
consider the price dynamics of newly built residential real estate units. We do so to rule out composition
e⁄ects in the supply of housing. As we show later this is done without loss of generality.
10Source: Bank of Italy.
14Table 1 is suggests that there was an additional positive e⁄ect on real estate price growth
that took place starting with 2001, the year when bequest taxation was abolished. But
the proposed general equilibrium analysis provides us with additional guidance about the
e⁄ect of bequest tax on real estate price growth.11 When bequest taxation is abolished,
agents reallocate a sizeable share of their housing stock toward donation and bequest. The
size of this reallocation in turn a⁄ects the extent of real estate appreciation. Therefore, it
is through the surge in the number of donations that the e⁄ect of the abolition of bequest
taxation is channeled to real estate prices. This general equilibrium e⁄ect provides us
with a rationalization of the estimation strategy we adopt. A preview of our empirical
strategy is as follows. We use a two-stage estimation strategy in our panel (￿xed e⁄ect)
regression. In the ￿rst stage, we regress the number of donations, market sales and the
level of real estate investment on a set of instruments, including the Tax dummy (Tax);
and additional controls. In the second stage, we use our estimate to assess the e⁄ect of
each of these three factors on real estate prices. Formally, we want to estimate:
￿pit = ￿i + ￿D ￿ Hdon
it + ￿S ￿ Hsale
it + ￿I ￿ ￿iH
t =Yt + ￿ ￿ (Controls)it + uit (27)
where, according to propositions 1 and 2, ￿pit is determined by the number of donations,
Hdon
it , and market sales, Hsale
it , per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and year t and
involving residential real estate units, and by ￿iH
t =Yt; the national growth rate of physical
investment in residential real estate (over GDP) between year t and t￿1. Endogeneity is
the main issue of this speci￿cation, since the number of sales and donations and the level
of investment are likely to respond to residential real estate appreciation.




t =Yt, by the following set of exogenous demographic and macroeconomic variables:
rt is the (national level) average interest rate on house mortgages in year t,12 ￿wit is
the growth rate of per capita employees￿compensation in city i between year t and t ￿ 1,
￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it, the change in the ratio of under 25 resident and over 65 resident
in city i between year t and t ￿ 1, and - naturally - Tax.13 There are good reasons to be-
lieve these instruments are exogenous and not weak: they either depend (almost directly)
11See the discussion after proposition 1.
12Notice that the rate rt - a borrowing rate - is not the same as Rt in proposition 2. Rt represents
the rate of return one would receive by investing in assets di⁄erent from real estate. In fact, Rt in our
empirical strategy is represented by the annual return on the stock market, Stock ￿ Rt.
13This abolition was one of the very ￿rst acts of the newly established government cabinet in 2001. Law
383/2001 stated that the tax previously imposed on bequest and donation among family members would
cease starting with transfers taking place after October 25th 2001.
15on monetary policy,14 as in the case of rt, on productivity and bargaining dynamics, as
in the case of ￿wit, on demographic dynamics, as for ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it or, ￿nally,
on exogenous tax decisions, as for Tax. We will focus on this last instrument, which is
central to test the implication of this study.
We also introduce some standard additional controls: Stock ￿ Rt, the stock market
(cum dividend) real annual return between year t and year t ￿ 1, (NetCapInflow=Y )t,
the net capital in￿ ow (net of the change in international reserves) over GDP in year t,15
￿Popit; the population growth rate in city i between year t and t ￿ 1: City dummies are
also included in the estimation and their coe¢ cients are omitted in the tables.
14Rudebusch [18] provides a good summary of why central banks should not target their monetary policy
to asset prices. Until recently, this was the vastly predominant view in central banking.
15This is measured by the ￿nancial account balance. In 2001, while bequest taxation was abolished, the
government also provided a ￿scal safeguard (Decree 350/2001) for all those funds that italian residents held
abroad and reentered national borders between November 1st 2001 and February 28th 2002. Since this























(NetCapInflow=Y )t 1.032** 0.026 -0.001
(0:063) (0:024) (0.008)
￿Popit 0.089* -0.003 -0.001
(0:038) (0:014) (0.003)
Stock ￿ Rt -0.025** -0.0007 0.0001
(0:003) (0:00008) (0.0002)
Observations 156 156 156
R-squared 0.88 0.93 0.92
F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 765.83 21.84 58.24




Tables 2.a and 2.b show the results of our empirical analysis. Consistently with the
economic intuition behind the theory set forward, the ￿rst stage of the regression displayed
in Table 2.a shows that the abolition of bequest and donation taxation had a positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the number of donations but negative on the number of real
estate sales. As intergenerational transfers made through donations become cheaper - i.e.
less taxed -, agents in the economy reallocate their housing stock away from the market
17and toward donation. All remaining coe¢ cients have an intuitive interpretation: the real
interest rate on mortgages - an indicator of credit availability - has a negative e⁄ect on both
investment in the real estate sector and the number of market transactions; a relatively
younger population, i.e. a larger ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65); increases market transactions
and decreases the number of donations; an increase in labor income, ￿wit(percapita),
increases market transactions but decreases the number of donation as would be expected
in the case of rationally altruistic agents, capital in￿ ows and population growth are likely
to have had a positive e⁄ect on the level of real estate investment, while they had no
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of market transactions and donations. The F-tests on the
￿rst stage lean toward the view the chosen instruments are not weak.
Tables 2.b displays the second stage of the regression and shows that the number of
donations has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on real estate price growth. Two main con-
siderations are worthwhile making. First, not surprisingly, we ￿nd that demand (Hsale
it and
Hdon
it ) and supply (￿iH
t =Yt) factors have a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the dynamics
of residential real estate prices. Second, donations - which are typically between 5% and
80% of the number of market transactions in our dataset, depending on the city and year
- have a particularly strong e⁄ect on real estate price growth, especially if compared with
market transactions. We ￿nd that, on average, if 1 more resident every 100 in a given
city and year receives a donation of a unit of residential real estate, its price increases by























* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test






Although we consider a closer test of our model to regress the change in real estate prices
on the yearly ￿ ows of donations and market transactions regarding residential real es-
tate during a given year, our empirical results are also robust to the possibility that the
growth of real estate prices responds to the change in the number of donations and market
transactions and not to their annual ￿ ows. To make this point clear, we regress a slightly
modi￿ed version of (27):
￿pit = ￿i + ￿ ￿ (￿Hdon
it ￿ ￿Hsale
it ) + ￿I ￿ ￿iH
t =Yt + ￿ ￿ (Controls)it + uit (28)
where instead of the the number of donations, Hdon
it , and market sales, Hsale
it , we introduce
as explanatory variable the di⁄erence between the change in the number of donations and
19market transactions, (￿Hdon
it ￿ ￿Hsale
it ). Consistently with the proposed theory, we ￿nd
that real estate price tend to increase when donations grow faster than market transactions.
We address the endogeneity of regressor (￿Hdon
it ￿￿Hsale
it ); as in the case of regression (27),
by instrumenting (￿Hdon
it ￿￿Hsale
it ) with the real interest rate, rt;the change in proportion
of young relative to old people in given year and city, ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it, and the
"bequest tax" time dummy, Tax. The reader can refer to the beginning of this section for
a discussion of why these are in our opinion appropriate instruments. Detailed ￿rst and
second stages are reported in Table 4.a and 4.b in the appendix.
One could ponder the possibility that the abolition of bequest taxation had a statis-
tically insigni￿cant e⁄ect on the price dynamics of newly built residential units, since the
units being donated are typically "used", i.e. pre-existing units. We replicate the empirical
exercise considered in (27) using as dependent variable only the real growth in the price
of "newly built" residential real estate in the di⁄erent cities of the sample, ￿pNEW
it . The
results are in line with Table 2.b and are reported for brevity in Table 5 in the appendix.
This is not surprising since, in equilibrium, the price of new and "used" real estate units
must move in the same direction: the di⁄erence in their prices can only be a premium (in
the levels) due to the di⁄erent qualities of the same asset (real estate).
We conduct two additional checks of the robustness of our results. First, we address
the concern that our central instrument, i.e. the Tax dummy variable, is capturing some
other time e⁄ect that was present before and is not related to the abolition of bequest
taxation. We do so by repeating the exercise in (27) but introducing di⁄erent "placebo"
time dummies taking value equal to one starting from years before and after 2001. The
second stage R-squares reported in Table 6 show that the time dummy capturing the
actual tax change, i.e. Tax, provides a better (or comparable) ￿t than the two "placebo"
alternatives.
Second, we address the concern that our regression is overlooking some general, europe-
wide trend toward real estate appreciation. If this were the case, the signi￿cance of our
Tax dummy variable could be a result of this sector speci￿c e⁄ect only. We thus perform
the same empirical exercise regarding the estimation of (27) but we add the real growth
rate in real estate prices in EU1516, ￿pt ￿ EU15; as control variable. The two stages of
this enriched regression are displayed in Tables 7.a and 7.b. They are vastly consistent
with what we found in the original regression (Tables 2.a and 2.b). In particular, Tax
remains a statistically signi￿cant instrument, even after the introduction of the additional
control ￿pt ￿ EU15. Moreover, we report in Figure 4 the average (cross-city) residuals
16Source: Eurostat. Data are available only starting from 1997.
20of regression (27) including and excluding ￿pt ￿ EU15: It is interesting to notice that
the additional variable does not seem to improve the ￿t of the model in the years around
the abolition of bequest taxation. This is particularly important because, as real estate
appreciation started in 1999 in Italy, one could be concerned that our Tax dummy is
only capturing an underlying European trend toward real estate appreciation. This does
not seem to be case as Tax retains its explanatory power even after the introduction of
￿pt ￿ EU15:
We ￿nally employ the constructed dataset and the estimates of (27) to provide a
preliminary evaluation of the city-level e⁄ect of the abolition of bequest and donation
taxation. This can be done exploiting the fact that di⁄erent cities displayed di⁄erent
reactions in terms of market transactions and donations to the abolition of bequest and
donation taxation at the national level. To estimate the real estate price appreciation
due to the tax change alone, we compute how much change in real estate prices would
be predicted by the change in the three instrumented variables that is determined by the



























where ￿2001Xit = Xi2001￿Xi2000, i.e. the change in variable X at city level between
year 2001 and 2000, c ￿j
IV ; j = D;S;I are second stage coe¢ cients estimated in equation
(27) and b ￿
j
TAX; j = D;S;I; are the ￿rst stage estimates for the coe¢ cients of the tax
dummy, Tax, on the three instrumented variables. The city level estimates are sizeable
and support the claim that change in bequest and donation taxation have important e⁄ects










Bari 16.6 Napoli 14.7
Bologna 14.3 Padova 16.3
Cagliari 16.6 Palermo 14.3
Catania 15.3 Roma 13.9
Firenze 14.4 Torino 14.3




This paper develops a theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship between
the ￿scal treatment of bequests and inter vivos donations and the price dynamics of long-
lasting assets in general and real estate in particular.
From a theoretical point of view, we show that, in a general equilibrium perspective,
changes in the level of taxation on bequests and donations a⁄ect real estate prices. To put
it shortly, as the market equilibrium for real estate is characterized by the coexistence of
donations and resales of houses, it must be the case that the marginal agent is indi⁄erent
between donation an resale of housing. When taxes on bequest and donations are lowered,
two e⁄ects take place. First, the marginal bene￿t of donating increases so that the amount
of donations increases (direct e⁄ect). Second, as more and more people donate their
housing stock, the market price of residential real estate increases until a new equilibrium
is reached where the marginal utilities of resales and donations are equalized (general
equilibrium e⁄ect).
From an empirical point of view, we test our theoretical predictions by exploiting
a unique policy shock (i.e. the abolition of bequest and donation taxation which took
place in Italy in 2001) through a novel rich and detailed dataset on real estate sales,
donations and prices at city level. By focusing on such unusual policy change (almost
a quasi natural experiment), this is the ￿rst paper in the literature to document the
e⁄ect of bequest and donation taxation on real estate prices. In particular, we ￿nd strong
supporting empirical evidence that the abolition of taxation on bequests and donations
had a signi￿cant and sizeable positive e⁄ect on real estate prices, on top of what can be
explained by macroeconomic and demographic factors. This result is robust to a set of
di⁄erent speci￿cations.
Real estate has a central role in the current global ￿nancial crisis. Therefore, we should
be particularly interested in any ￿scal and tax policy that may a⁄ect its price, especially
when this e⁄ect is the result of an unexpected general equilibrium mechanism and it is
sizeable, as the Italian evidence suggests. After all, real estate may still be ￿the root of
all evil￿in future ￿nancial and economic crises.
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6 Appendix
The solution to the problem in section 2 is equivalent to the maximization of the following
Lagrangian function, L:
L = Ut + ￿Ut+1 + ￿((1 ￿ ￿)Ht ￿ Hsale
t ￿ Hdon
t ) + ￿(Hmkt
t + f(iH
t ) ￿ Ht)
add constraint for Hmkt
t represents the actual amount of housing that generation t acquires
through intergenerational transfers and private markets in period t::::






+ (1 ￿ ￿)Dt￿1 ￿ iH
t (29)
c2t = stRt+1 + pt+1Hsale
t ￿ Dt (30)
where ￿ and ￿ represent the multipliers on constraints (5) and (4) respectively. We
substitute c1t and c2t according to (2) and (3). The relevant ￿rst order conditions are:
u0(c1t) = Rt+1u0(c2t) (st)
v0(Ht) = ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) (Ht)
24ptu0(c1t) = ￿ (Hmkt
t )
pt+1u0(c2t) = ￿ (Hsale
t )
(1 ￿ ￿)pt+1 ￿ ￿u0(c1t+1) = ￿ (Hdon
t )
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿u0(c1t+1) = u0(c2t) (Dt)
￿f 0(iH
t ) = u0(c1t) (iH
t )
Proof Proposition 2.
2. Assume that ￿ increases. Then, by (22):
p >
v0(H)
u0(c1)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
and nobody would buy housing since the marginal cost is higher than the marginal bene￿t.
But then p must fall and so, by (23), iH also decreases. Thus, by (12), H decreases while,
by (2), c1 (weakly) increases delivering a new housing price p below the original one.
3. By (20), an increase in ￿ decreases r. If the substitution e⁄ect dominates the






must increase for (22) to be satis￿ed. Since u0(c1) decreases,
something else must adjust. Assume, by contradiction, that v0(H) decreases alone. This
implies that H increases. But this is only possible, by (12), if iH also increases. Then, by




















￿wit(per capita) -0.009 -1.226
(0:03) (1:786)








F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 633.12 13.68
SE in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 5%
































* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test





























* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test







R-squared - 2nd stage
Pseudo ￿ Tax


































(NetCapInflow=Y )t 0.290** 0.029 0.012
(0.002) (0.028) (0.014)
￿Popit 0.004 -0.022 0.002
(0.004) (0.023) (0.007)
Stock ￿ Rt -0.001** -0.003* -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
￿pt ￿ EU15 0.874** -0.018 -0.038*
(0.003) (0.029) (0.015)
Observations 104 104 104
R-squared 0.99 0.95 0.97
F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 252:3 875.26 394.95




























* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test






















it are the annual real growth rate in, respectively, not renovated and
renovated/new urban residential real estate prices (per squared meter) in the 13 major
Italian cities (Source: Nomisma Real Estate, proprietary data)
Hdon
it is the number of donations per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and year t in
residential real estate units Italian national institute (Source: ISTAT and Italian Ministry
of Economics)
Hsale
it is the number of market sales per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and year
t and involving residential real estate units (Source: Nomisma Real Estate, proprietary
data)
EU15￿pt is the annual real growth rate in real estate prices in the ￿rst 15 countries
of the European Union (Source: Eurostat)
￿iH
t =Yt is the national growth rate of physical investment in residential real estate
(over GDP) between year t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
rt is the (national level) average interest rate on house mortgages in year t (Source:
Bank of Italy)
￿wit is the growth rate of per capita employees￿compensation in city i between year
t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it is the change in the ratio of under 25 resident and over 65
resident in city i between year t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
Stock ￿ Rt is the stock market (cum dividend) real annual return between year t and
year t ￿ 1 (Source: Research Department, Mediobanca)
(NetCapInflow=Y )t is the net capital in￿ ow (net of the change in international re-
serves) over GDP in year t (Source: National Accounts, Bank of Italy)
￿Popit is the population growth rate in city i between year t and t￿1 (Source: ISTAT)
33Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
r 4.59 2.488 1.35 8.122 156
Delta(Res<25/Res>65) -3.619 1.092 -5.571 0.144 156
Delta(w) 0.151 1.599 -4.05 5.520 156
NetCapIn￿ ow/Y -0.189 0.938 -1.632 1.402 156
DeltaPop -0.724 1.205 -10.895 4.25 156
Stock-R 14.198 24.545 -24.23 54.353 156
mkt100ab 1.299 0.768 0.223 3.395 156
don100ab 0.318 0.217 0.038 1.071 156
Delta(don100ab) - Delta(mkt100ab) 7.168 57.606 -75.589 320.345 156
Delta(i)/Y 0.15 1.961 -2.6 3.8 156
Delta(pNEW) 0.253 6.927 -17.745 15.732 156
Delta(p) 0.271 6.919 -15.072 15.147 156
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